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ABSTRACT
We show that the strength of Internet-based network interconnectivity of countries is increasing over time. We
then evaluate bounds on the extent to which a group of colluding countries can disrupt this connectivity. We
evaluate the degree to which a group of countries can disconnect two other countries, isolate a set of countries
from the Internet, or even break the Internet up into non-communicative clusters. To do this, we create an
interconnectivity map of the worldwide Internet routing infrastructure at a country level of abstraction. We
then examine how groups of countries may use their pieces of routing infrastructure to filter out the traffic of
other countries (or to block entire routes). Overall, bounds analysis indicates that the ability of countries to
perform such disruptions to connectivity has diminished significantly from 2008 to 2013. However, we show
that the majority of the gains in robustness go to countries that had already displayed significant robustness to
the types of attacks that we consider. The countries that displayed higher initial vulnerability to such attacks did
not become significantly more robust over the time period of analysis.
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1. Introduction
The Internet was designed to be robust to disruption due to the
failure of specific networks or routers [1]. However, events
have empirically demonstrated that despite this design, single
points of failure (e.g., the digging up of a fiber optic cable, or
the cutting of a submarine line by a ship anchor) are capable
of disconnecting entire countries from the rest of the Internet
[2] [3] [4]. In this study, we examine the potential of deliberate
disruption or filtering enacted on inter-country network routes.
In particular, we examine to what extent a group of colluding
countries can disrupt Internet connectivity for other countries in
several ways: by disconnecting two other countries, isolating a
set of countries from the Internet, or even breaking the Internet
up into small non-communicative clusters.
To do this, we create an interconnectivity map of the world-
wide Internet routing infrastructure, aggregated at the level of
individual countries. We then apply graph algorithms to de-
termine bounds on the degree to which groups of colluding
countries of varying sizes can adversely affect the connectivity
of other countries. We evaluate pairwise connectivity, node par-
titioning while minimizing the maximal cluster size, and node
partitioning while maximizing the number of clusters. The latter
two measurement are NP-Hard and so we use a suite of 5 heuris-
tic algorithms to approximate optimal answers. We perform
these experiments on graphs of Internet interconnectivity, at the
country level of abstraction, covering the years 2008 to 2013.
The data indicates that the overall ability of countries to
disrupt connectivity in the ways we examine has consistently
decreased from 2008 to 2013. However, this increase in ro-
bustness appears to be limited to sets of countries that already
exhibited high degrees of robustness to such disruptions. The
remaining countries remained relatively vulnerable to connec-
tivity disruptions by groups of colluding countries. This “rich
get richer” scenario has been observed in generative models of
scale-free graphs, such as interconnectivity of the World Wide
Web [5], where entities with the highest number of links receive
a higher share of new links. We hypothesize that countries with
fewer independent connections to the Internet find it difficult to
obtain additional links, and so remain vulnerable to connectivity
disruptions by groups of colluding countries (typically the more
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resilient highly connected countries).
Due to the complexity of the worldwide Internet and limi-
tations in the measurement infrastructure, our interconnectivity
map is a proper subset of actual worldwide connectivity. We
also do not include policy-based routing restrictions (the ‘valley-
free’ condition of [6]), which are known to limit connectivity
as well [7] [8] [9]. For that reason, our results provide bounds
to the damage that can be done, as opposed to exact measure-
ments. Because of these same data limitations, we are unable
to perform a precise comparative study of countries, and so we
focus on overall trends rather than on any specific countries.
This work constitutes the first study to propose, quantify,
and measure this important class of Internet threats. To our
knowledge, this is also the first study to construct a country
to country connectivity graph of the Internet to study security.
Furthermore, we provide a defensible methodology to provide
trending analyses on this graph in the presence of only partial
data. Indeed, at the beginning of our study we thought that
the data limitations would prevent us from obtaining rigorous
results, and an important contribution of this work is to show
how to work through those data limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the background on the data set we used to model
inter-country Internet topology and limitations surrounding the
use of that data. Section 3 discusses our actual data collection
activities and provides general statistics on the resulting country
connectivity graphs. Section 4 describes our experiments and
section 5 provides our results. Section 6 discusses related work.
Section 7 discusses future work and section 8 concludes.
2. Background
The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)
has a worldwide monitoring network that provides an approxi-
mate topological map of the Internet at the Internet Protocol (IP)
layer [10]. It then uses the RouteViews [11] Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) data to collapse the IP topology into a map of
autonomous systems (ASs), approximately the set of Internet
Service Providers [10]. More formally, an AS is a set of routers
under common management where the group of routers presents
a unified routing policy (to other ASs and to a set of network pre-
fixes for which it provides Internet access) [12]. Individual ASs
are the basic units of routing policy, and together collectively
form the routing infrastructure of the Internet. CAIDA maps
each AS to the company that owns it and to the country in which
that company is registered. It is this graph of interconnected
ASs on which we perform our experimentation. In particular, we
use the country mappings to condense the global AS map into
a network of countries, and then evaluate inter-country connec-
tivity (the handling of multinational ASs is discussed in section
3).
2.1 Archipelago Infrastructure
CAIDA continuously updates its IP level topological map through
the employment of its Archipelago (Ark) measurement infras-
tructure. As of 2014-05-09, Ark had 94 monitors distributed
worldwide, separated into three teams. Every 2 to 3 days, each
team uses a traceroute-like procedure to probe a random IP ad-
dress within each /24 subnet in the IPv4 address space. This
yields a list of routers connecting the monitor to the target IP.
The monitor to target IP mapping varies randomly so that, over
time, each subnet is accessed from many different parts of the
world, revealing the primary pathways through the Internet.
As shown in Figure 1, the monitors cover every continent
with the exception of Antarctica, although the majority of moni-
tors are placed in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
Monitors are sparse in Africa (5) and South America (4). There
are no monitors in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or in Russia.
The dearth of monitors in a particular geographical area does
not prohibit probing IPs in that region, however it does present
limitations in mapping connectivity between regional ASs, as
we discuss below.
Figure 1. Physical Location of Ark Monitors (2014-05-12) (map
provided by [5]).
2.2 Data Limitations
The Ark measurement infrastructure does not guarantee to dis-
cover all network paths. As BGP routing established preferred
routes between particular ASs on the basis of a combination of
transit policy and shortest path algorithms, the Ark infrastruc-
ture is only capable of discovering preferred paths to and from
ASs containing a monitor. Routes between third party ASs that
do not lie on a preferred route from a monitored AS to a target
AS will not be discovered.
For example, consider two countries, A and B, each of which
has a single AS and neither of which have an Ark monitor. As-
sume that the ASs of A and B have no customer ASs themselves,
but do have a peering relationship with each other, and are both
customers of an AS in a third country, C. Because of the cus-
tomer relationships and the valley-free condition [6], all Ark
traffic to either A or B will always be routed through C. The
peering relationship between A and B, in the absence of an Ark
monitor located in the customer pool of either A or B, cannot
be discovered, as no other path that includes both A and B can
exist.
Another limitation is that some ASs cannot be mapped to
a particular country (because this information is not available).
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In our work, we must drop such ASs from the graph since we
aggregate ASs into the countries in which they are registered.
0.11% of the ASs in our experiment fall into this category and
this rate is consistent across all years of experimentation.
The Ark infrastructure also identifies routes between ASs as
either direct or indirect. With a direct route, Ark sees an IP in
one AS directly communicate with an IP in a second AS. With
indirect routes, the two ASs are separated by one or more IPs
for which an AS could not be identified (either the AS was not
registered for the IP or the IP was non-responding). We omit
indirect routes from our graphs since we do not know to which
country the intermediate ASs belong.
These three limitations cause us to ignore many potential
routes that could contribute to the strength of connectivity of the
Internet (often localized to specific parts of the globe). Despite
this, we can still perform rigorous and defensible experimen-
tation by focusing on calculating bounds for global trends. In
particular, we focus on calculating the maximum disruption
a group of countries can cause to global Internet connectivity
or to connectivity between arbitrary pairs of countries, given
our incomplete measurements of the total connectivity. Future
improvements to Ark relative to these limitations will enable
more accurate measurements that will allow us to sharpen these
bounds.
Lastly, the Ark monitors are biased towards detecting routes
with high capacity since these are likely to be the preferred
routes announced by ASs. However, the monitors do not at-
tempt to measure the capacity of any particular route and only
provide connectivity information. Thus, our experimentation on
the Ark data is limited to evaluating the connectivity between
ASs and countries, and we do not evaluate cascading effects of
traffic being rerouted in the event of a disruption to a particular
link (as was done in [13] for regional failures). That said, the
research done on cascading failures indicates that severance of
high capacity preferred routes can result in quick saturation of
smaller capacity alternative routes.
3. Data Collection
We downloaded all CAIDA data files on AS connectivity from
2008 to 2013 inclusive (2855 data files totaling 849 MB). We
created a graph for each of these 6 years using the NetworkX
graph library version 1.8.1 [14] and Python version 2.7.6. As
discussed above, we removed AS nodes for indirect links and
where country information was not available (as of 2014-05-16).
We also model all direct links as bidirectional since, for our
experiments, we are concerned about the capability to transmit
data as opposed to currently policy-based directionality of traffic
flow. The motivation here is that we want to see the amount
of damage that can be instantiated by a group of countries that
cannot be fixed through a simple policy change relative to routes
to the affected countries. The assumption is that the kinds of
attacks modeled in this paper may cause severe emergency situ-
ations to which ASs are likely to attempt remediation through a
quick response of reconfiguring route policy. We want to model
the damage that can be done regardless of attempts to remediate
the damage through quick configuration changes.
Table 1 shows the number of ASs and edges in each year of
data; notice the 54 % growth of the number of ASs and the 92
% increase in the number of observed edges from 2008 to 2013.
Table 1. Number of ASs and Edges per Monitored Year.
Year Number
of ASs
Number of
Edges
Number of
Monitors
2008 28 821 111 487 33
2009 32 037 127 762 42
2010 35 404 153 701 54
2011 38 732 177 891 59
2012 41 613 178 825 65
2013 44 390 213 883 89
We then used the AS to country mappings to aggregate
the AS nodes into country nodes where edges represent inter-
country connectivity. This mapping assigns ASs to their country
of registration despite the physical location of the ASs servers
(the ramifications of this are discussed further below). While it
is a small subset, some of the ASs have servers that cover every
continent but Antarctica.
Table 2 shows the number of countries and edges in each
year of data. The number of countries participating in the
global Internet routing infrastructure increased 8.7% during
the timeframe we examine, while the visible inter-country edges
increased 54.5%. Note that the current upper bound on the
possible number of visible countries is 249 as defined by the
“officially assigned” International Standards Organization (ISO)
country codes [15]. This set of countries is fairly inclusive as
the United States recognizes only 195 independent states [34]
and there are only 193 member of the United Nations [35].
Table 2. Number of Countries and Edges per Monitored Year.
Year Number
of Coun-
tries
Number of
Edges
Number of
Monitors
2008 206 2235 33
2009 211 2343 42
2010 218 2644 54
2011 219 2925 59
2012 221 3138 65
2013 224 3452 89
The graphs from which the information in Table 2 is derived
are useful for evaluating bounds on the resilience of a particular
year. However, the addition of new monitors with new vantage
points, as well as the retiring of old monitors, means that the
visible portions of the routing graph vary significantly from year
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to year, independent of changes in the underlying routing graph
itself. This makes it difficult to reliably compare the resilience
between different years. To enable year to year comparisons,
we restrict the discovered routes to those visible to a set of 24
monitors that were active in all 6 years of our evaluation. Table
3 shows the number of countries and edges in each year of this
restricted data set.
Table 3. Number of Countries and Edges per Monitored Year
from a Persistent set of Monitors.
Year Number
of Coun-
tries
Number
of Edges
Number
of Moni-
tors
% Ex-
cluded
Monitors
2008 206 2149 24 27 %
2009 210 2243 24 43 %
2010 218 2370 24 56 %
2011 219 2513 24 59 %
2012 221 2731 24 63 %
2013 223 2829 24 73 %
Unfortunately, this approach is biased against the latter years,
making them appear less resilient. The problem is that the
percentage of excluded monitors increases from 27 % in 2008
to 73 % in 2013 and these exclusions are tightly correlated to
the amount of data that is discarded. Since every IPv4 subnet is
scanned 3 times every 2 to 3 days regardless of the number of
monitors, this means that in the latter years we are discarding a
larger and larger percentage of these periodic scans (reducing
our chances of finding new routes). As we will show, despite
this limitation in showing the full resiliency of the latter years,
the data still suggests the increasing resiliency of the Internet
over time (although this limitation in our data will cause us to
underestimate the strength of the increase).
A visualization of country connectivity for 2013 is shown
in Figure 2. The nodes are sized proportional to their degree.
The 140 nodes with degree greater than 10 are shown in white
(mostly in the center). The 84 nodes of degree 10 or less are
shown in red on the periphery. Notice how the red nodes primar-
ily connect to the white nodes. Of the 3452 edges, only 14 edges
(0.41 %) connect two red nodes. This suggests that the graph
has a degree of negative assortativity, as is common in many
communications networks [16]. Connectivity-poor nations tend
to be connected to connectivity-rich nations, and only rarely
to other low-degree countries. Notice also the large number of
high degree nodes in the middle. While the connections are not
visible in the graph, these high degree nodes are densely mutu-
ally connected, forming an extremely resilient core for Internet
communications.
One aspect of the data that deserves special consideration
is the existence of multinational ASs (MOAs). MOAs are ASs
that have points of presence (PoPs) within multiple countries.
Some MOAs have PoPs in many countries on multiple conti-
Figure 2. Country Connectivity for 2013 using all monitors.
nents. For our work, we map MOAs to their home country (i.e.,
country of registration). Under this model, a MOAs is required
to implement Internet filtering laws or government directives
from their home country regardless of the physical location of
the routers they own. This is similar to the U.S. export control
system [17] where national security sensitive technology is not
allowed to be sent to a target list of countries regardless of the
physical location of a branch of a company. The rationale for
our approach comes from the legal literature: “the home country
may also have laws that attempt to regulate business activities of
the company that are conducted outside the home country” [18].
Also see [19] [20] for similar analyses. The work of [9] briefly
examined the assumption that ‘national incumbent telecom op-
erators will follow orders from their respective governments,’
and found no ‘behavior that suggests otherwise.’ If for a par-
ticular country, the strength of control over a MOA is less than
represented by our model, this presents another limitation anal-
ogous to the previously stated data limitations that only lower
our upper bounds (or raise our lower bounds) and thus do not
nullify our results.
To illustrate MOAs versus non-multinational ASs, we pro-
vide four examples taken from the CAIDA website on 2014-8-26
(mapping software credited to Google).
Figure 3. Single Country Autonomous System.
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Figure 3 shows an AS (non-multinational) whose PoPs exist
within the geographic boundary of a single country and which
is registered to that country.
Figure 4. Multinational Autonomous System Centered Around
a Single Country.
Figure 4 shows a multinational AS that is geographically
centered around a single country and is registered to that country
(France) but that has PoPs in adjacent countries (e.g., Spain,
Italy, and Germany) while also having a PoP in the United
States.
Figure 5. Multinational Autonomous System Spread Over a
Continent.
Figure 5 shows a multinational AS that is spread throughout
a continent with no obvious country of pertinence.
Figure 6. Largest Multinational Autonomous System.
Figure 6 shows the largest multinational AS in the world
according to the CAIDA website as of 2014-8-26. This very
unusual AS has PoPs in every continent except Antarctica.
4. Experiment Description
In our experiments, we evaluate 3 Internet connectivity security
questions pertaining to our country level abstraction:
1. Cutting Pairwise Communications: What is the mini-
mal number of colluding countries required to prevent
two other countries from communicating?
2. Country Isolation: What is the maximal number of coun-
tries that can be cut off from the Internet by a group of
colluding countries?
3. Non-Communicative Clusters: Into how many non com-
municative clusters can a group of colluding countries
divide the Internet?
These questions are modeled as countries completely cutting
off routes to other countries. While this certainly can be done,
we use this approach to model a large class of attacks (possibly
as yet undiscovered) whereby selective traffic along country to
country routes may be maliciously handled.
We evaluate each of these questions against the connectivity
graphs covering the years 2008 to 2013. We use all the monitor
data (i.e., Table 2) to create lower bounds for question 1 and
upper bounds for questions 2 and 3. Note that these bounds
are not comparable year to year because of the shift in monitor
placements over time (discussed in section 3). To enable year to
year comparison, we then use the persistent monitor data (i.e.,
Table 3) to provide us resiliency trends for the 3 questions using
a static set of 24 monitors.
For the analysis of our experiment, we introduce the fol-
lowing notations. We assume that the network is given as an
un-weighted undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of
nodes and E is the set of edges, with |V |= n and |E|= m. We de-
note by S the set of colluding countries (i.e., nodes of the graph)
with its cardinality given by |S|= k. We let G\S designate the
graph of the network when nodes in S are removed, along with
their associated edges (i.e., the colluding countries stop forward-
ing packets). With the nodes S removed, the graph G\S may
be disconnected into a set of clusters unable to communicate
with each other (i.e., disjoint connected components). We let
C (G\S) be the set of connected components, with its cardinality
denoted by |C (G\S)|. Finally, we let Cmax(S) be the component
in G\S with the maximum number of nodes. Notice that in this
paper, we are only interested in the size of the maximal cluster
|Cmax(S)|. For notational convenience, we drop the dependence
on S and only use Cmax and |Cmax| in the rest of this paper when
there is no chance of confusion.
Note that these experiments are scoped to model a set of
countries passing laws or directives relative to Internet filter-
ing that pertain to their own companies (wherever the physical
routers may reside). Out of scope is modeling a country exerting
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control over routers physically in its geographic boundary that
are owned by a company from another country (this could be
considered in future work). Also out of scope are actions that
countries might take in response to Internet filtering laws en-
acted by another country (e.g., nationalizing routers or peering
points within their geographic boundaries).
4.1 Cutting Pairwise Communications
The communications of two countries, s and t, are considered
prevented or cut if the ASs registered to s cease having connec-
tivity the ASs registered to t. To evaluate the cutting of pairwise
communications (our first security question), we iterate over all
pairs of countries (s, t) that are not adjacent and determine the
minimum, maximum, and mean node connectivity. The node
connectivity calculation determines the minimum number of
nodes required to disconnect the graph such that s and t end up
in separate components. We used a NetworkX implementation
that is based on the Ford and Fulkerson flow algorithm [21]. In
performing these calculations, we also measure the number of
directly connected countries and how that changes over time.
This measurement shows the number of invulnerable pairs of
countries (those that cannot be separated by any set of colluding
countries).
4.2 Country Isolation
A country is considered cut off from the Internet or isolated if the
ASs registered to that particular country cease having connectiv-
ity to the largest remaining connected component of the global
Internet. In the country isolation problem (our second question)
we would like to know the maximal number of countries that can
be cut off from the Internet (i.e., the largest remaining connected
component) by a group of k colluding countries. Recall that we
use S (with |S| = k) to designate a generic group of colluding
countries and |Cmax| for the size of the maximum connected
component of the graph of the network once the nodes in S are
removed. With these notations, the country isolation problem
can be cast as the following combinatorial optimization
max(S⊆V,|S|≤k)(n− k−|Cmax|), (1)
where, n = |V | is the total number of nodes in the network
For a given network and a fixed number of colluding coun-
tries k, this is equivalent to minimizing the size of the maximal
cluster
min(S⊆V,|S|≤k)(|Cmax|). (2)
For fixed k, this is obtained when all components are of as
equal size as possible. This problem is known to be in general
NP-hard [22], [23], [24], [36].
To work around this, we resort to 5 different heuristic algo-
rithms (described in section 4.4). For each value of the number
of colluding countries k, we run each of the algorithms and
choose the best result as our approximation for the solution of
the optimization.
To evaluate country isolation, we iteratively increase the
size k of the set of colluding countries and, at each iteration, use
our algorithms to choose a specific set of country nodes that
(approximately) minimize the maximal cluster size. We then
calculate the number of isolated countries as equal to the total
number of countries minus the number of colluding countries
minus the size of maximal cluster (i.e., n− k−|Cmax|).
4.3 Non-Communicative Clusters
The Internet is considered to be broken into non-communicative
pieces if the ASs registered to a group of countries are con-
nected while being disconnected from the rest of the Internet.
In our country graph, there will be multiple isolated clusters
(possibly consisting of just single nodes) after removing the
colluding nodes. In this non-communicative clusters problem,
the goal of the colluding countries is to maximize the number
of non-communicative clusters. This also can be modelled as
the following combinatorial problem
max(S⊆V,|S|≤k)(|C (G\S)|). (3)
This is similar to country isolation except that instead of
optimizing on the number of isolated countries, the algorithms
must optimize on the number of isolated clusters. We use the
same set of algorithms to compute an approximate solution.
As in the previous subsection, to evaluate non-communicative
clusters (our third security question), we iteratively increase the
size k of the set of colluding countries and, at each iteration, we
use our algorithms to choose a specific set of country nodes that
best approximate the maximum above.
4.4 Heuristic Algorithms
As stated earlier, solving the country isolation problem (or the
non-communicative clusters problem) is in general NP-Hard.
While many approximation algorithms exist for graph cut prob-
lems where edges are to be cut (e.g., see [25] for a survey), there
appears to be much less work on vertex-based cuts (although
see [26]). In this paper, we combine five heuristic algorithms to
find approximate solutions to the graph partition problems we
describe when nodes rather than edges are to be removed from
the graph to create the cuts. The algorithms are all iterative and
are described below.
1. Iterative removal of maximal degree node (DEG): This
approach is motivated by the observation that approxi-
mately scale-free networks, such as the Internet, are very
sensitive to attacks that target nodes with largest degrees
[27]. In our DEG algorithm, we iteratively remove the
node with the maximum degree in the remaining graph
as well as all edges that are incident to it. After each
iteration, we re-compute the degree of all nodes and recall
the routine until k nodes are removed.
2. Iterative greedy removal (GRD): In this approach, as in
DEG, nodes are removed one-by-one. However, instead
of removing the node with largest degree, at each step,
we remove the node that minimizes the size of the current
largest cluster (or maximize the number of components
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for the non-communicative clusters problem). After each
iteration, we update the graph and iterate until k nodes are
removed.
3. Iterative Minimal Separator (IMS): For small networks
of hundreds of nodes (like the ones considered in this
paper), there exists an efficient algorithm that enumerates
all minimal vertex separators [26]. A vertex separator
of a graph is a set of nodes whose removal separates the
graph into at least two connected components. A minimal
separator is one that is not a proper subset of any other
separator. In our IMS heuristic, we iteratively use the
minimal separator enumeration algorithm proposed in
[26]. In each run, we enumerate the minimal separators
of the current largest component and choose the minimal
separator that optimizes a given criterion (e.g., minimize
the size of the largest cluster for country isolation, or
maximize the number of clusters for non-communicative
clusters). We remove the nodes in the chosen separator
and iterate until k nodes are removed.
4. Iterative Vertex Bisection I (IVB-I): In this approach, we
iteratively apply the bisection algorithm presented in [28].
In each run, the algorithm in [28] is applied to the largest
cluster at hand to find a vertex separator that produces two
clusters of roughly equal size. However, sometimes the
algorithm returns more than two components when one
of the clusters (after removing the vertex separator) is not
connected. We remove the nodes in the vertex separator
and repeat this procedure until k nodes are removed. The
main motivation in using this algorithm (and the next
one) is that a solution to the optimization in equation (2)
will lead to connected components that are roughly of
the same sizes and thus minimize the size of the largest
cluster.
5. Iterative Vertex Bisection II (IVB-II): We designed a new
approach to iteratively bisect the largest remaining cluster
until all k nodes are removed. For each bisection attempt,
we randomly choose pairs of nodes and iteratively grow
pairs of non-overlapping trees. To grow trees, we maintain
a first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue of nodes to be processed
(that are already in the tree) for each tree. When process-
ing a node, we choose a random edge that has never been
used and that is incident with a new node that is in neither
tree. The new node and the processed node are both added
to the end of the queue. We take the pair of trees that best
optimizes the objective and then compare them against
the output of the DEG algorithm (limited to the number of
nodes removed in the tree bisection), with the best result
being chosen. This is thus a hybrid algorithm where at
each bisection iteration, the best output of two different
heuristics is used. Empirically, the overall algorithm does
switch between using both heuristic methods within its
bisection iterations (generally using the tree approach first
followed by uses of DEG when the cluster size is small
and the set of available vertices to remove are few).
Analyzing the performance of the different algorithms is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, we do note that no single
algorithm empirically dominated the others, and that all five
approaches were capable of producing high-quality partitions
for some combination of graph and quality function. For the
networks considered in this paper, we have observed that IVB-I
and GRD provided the best results most often, however they did
not do so uniformly.
While not immediately apparent, DEG can be implemented
in O(n+m) linear time, by using an array of dictionaries, and
is reasonably effective overall. Apart from DEG, the algorithms
scale at most to thousands of nodes using commodity hardware.
We have run our DEG implementation and obtains fast results
on graphs with many tens of thousands of nodes on commodity
computers and on graphs with up to 30 million nodes using more
specialized equipment. This makes DEG an obvious candidate
for follow on work that performed a similar analysis on the
actual PoPs within each AS as the CAIDA datasets indicates
that there are millions of PoPs comprising the Internet.
For our empirical results, each data point is analyzed by all
5 algorithms but only the result that best optimizes the relevant
security question is kept. Thus, each presented curve in section
5 is made up of answers from all 5 algorithms, representing our
best available approximation of the true NP-Hard answer.
Note that a rich set of vertex partitioning heuristics are avail-
able. Two others that we did not implement for the generation
of this data set are as follows:
1. Iterative removal of maximal betweenness node (BET):
This approach is inspired by the observation that in com-
munication networks there are many low degree nodes
that tend to talk to a few high degree ‘hub’ nodes while the
few hub nodes talk to the many low degree nodes. As a
consequence, most paths go through the hubs nodes. The
fraction of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that
pass through a given node is defined as its “betweenness
centrality”. In the BET approach, we iteratively remove
the node with the largest betweenness centrality in the
remaining graph as well as all edges that are incident to
it. After each iteration, we re-compute the betweenness
centrality of all nodes and recall the routine until k nodes
are removed.
2. Iterative Fiedler separation (IFS): Chen and Hero [36]
considers the same problem of removing a set of nodes
to minimize the size the maximum cluster in the remain-
ing graph. They relate the optimization problem to the
spectrum of the graph and propose a heuristic approxima-
tion algorithm, which works as follow: In each iteration,
it first computes the Fiedler vector (i.e. the eigenvector
associated with the second smallest eigenvalue) of the
largest component and uses it to derive a spectral cut. The
spectral cut is the set of edges whose two end nodes have
different signs in the Fiedler vector. Then, it removes the
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node incident to the spectral cut, whose removal mini-
mizes the size of the resulting largest component.
5. Bounding Results
Our experiments indicate that the robustness of the Internet as
a whole is increasing over time with respect to connectivity
disruptions by a group of colluding countries. However, these
gains tended to concentrate in countries already robust to such
attacks. The group of less robust, less connected countries
had results that remained fairly constant over the time period
of investigation. Despite the increase in overall robustness, a
small group of densely connected colluding countries remained
capable of doing significant damage, even as late as 2013. We
provide results that bound this amount of damage relative to the
size of the group of colluding countries.
As discussed previously, all of these results show bounds on
the worst case damage that could be inflicted. Since this applies
to all of our results, we do not repeat this when giving each
result. However, we want to emphasize that any conclusions
taken from the data must take this into account. A reduction in
the upper bound over time may represent a real improvement
in the robustness of the Internet, or it may represent a more
accurate measure of a stable quantity that results in a reduction
of the worst case upper bound. As we keep the measurement
infrastructure constant from year to year when using the ‘persis-
tent monitor’ data, we then can interpret changes to a measured
bound as being more likely correlated to actual changes in the
security posture.
5.1 Cutting Pairwise Communications
The data shows that it is quite feasible for groups of colluding
countries to block communications between pairs of countries,
although this is becoming more difficult to implement over time.
For all years and both data sets (those from Table 2 and Table
3), the minimum pairwise connectivity was 1. This indicates
that given the routes visible through the CAIDA dataset, there
always exists some country that by itself can disconnect some
other pair of countries. However, some non-adjacent pairs of
countries are extremely hard to disconnect. As shown in Figure
7 on the “all data” line, in 2013 there were non-adjacent pairs
of countries that required collusion between a minimum of 68
countries in order to disconnect them. Furthermore, the data
from the set of persistent monitors shows an increasing trend
over time.
An oddity of the data is that in 2012, the maximum connec-
tivity value when restricted to the persistent monitors exceeded
that value when considering all the data (intuitively, a subset of
the data would be expected to have less connectivity). This re-
sults from the persistent monitors being unable to observe some
edges present in the complete data that show several countries
adjacent to each other. This adjacency removes them from the
connectivity calculation (because their connectivity is infinitely
large), and leaves a smaller pool of country pairs that are po-
tentially separable. Figure 8 shows the ratio of invulnerable
Figure 7. Minimum Number of Colluding Countries Needed to
Disconnect the Most Well Connected Countries.
pairs to total pairs for each year. In 2013 using all the data, 13.8
% of the country pairs were invulnerable to disruption. When
analyzing the trend over time using the persistent monitor data,
there is a clear increase in pairwise invulnerability, particularly
from 2010 to 2013, as the country to country connectivity graph
becomes denser.
Figure 8. Increasing Amount of Invulnerable Pairs.
Finally, we evaluate the mean connectivity in Figure 9. On
average, it took 9.41 countries to disconnect a pair of countries in
2013 (using all the data). Using the persistent monitor data, we
see a clear increase in the mean connectivity over time showing
the increasing resilience of the Internet to such collusion attacks.
5.2 Country Isolation
Figure 10 shows the fraction of isolated nodes as a function
of the number of colluding countries for the period 2008-2013.
We have plotted the curves for both data sets (from Table 2 and
Table 3). We observe a linear increase in the number of isolated
countries as the number of colluding countries increases from 1
to around 60. This is the case for both data sets for all years.
Notice that, as expected, the fraction of isolated nodes is
slightly larger for the persistent monitor data. Indeed, many
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Figure 9. Mean Number of Collaborating Countries Needed to
Disconnect a Pair of Countries.
links are not considered in the persistent monitor data set, which
leads to a less resilient network.
The increasing resilience of the Internet can be seen by
observing the slopes of the curves, which decrease over the
years, as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Fraction of Isolated Nodes as a Function of the
Number of Colluding Countries.
A comparison of the fraction of isolated countries between
the years 2008 and 2013 highlights the improvement more dra-
matically (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. Improvement in Robustness: Comparing 2008 to
2013.
Another way to see this improvement in robustness is to ask:
how many colluding countries does it take to isolate a fraction
of x% of the Internet? Figure 12 shows that over time, more
countries need to collude in order to cut off the same fraction
of countries from the Internet. However, these increases are
for larger percentages of the countries. The ‘cost’ of isolating
just 10 % of the countries in the Internet is small and relatively
stable. This indicates that the Internet is still sensitive to collud-
ing attacks, and suggests that a fringe set of countries are not
receiving the benefits of increased robustness.
Figure 12. . Number of Colluding Countries Needed to Isolate
a Fraction x% of the Nodes as a Function of the Year. “A, 10%”
in the Legend, means that the plot is done using the entire data
set, and the fraction of isolated nodes is 10%; “P” indicates
that only the persistent monitor data is used.
5.3 Non-Communicative Clusters
Figure 13 shows the number of non-communicative clusters as
a function of the number of colluding countries. We observe
a linear increase in the number of clusters as more countries
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collude. However, the rate of increase diminishes over time
indicating that the Internet has become more resilient since
2008. The number of clusters that can be created by a particular
sized group of countries has approximately halved from 2008 to
2013.
Figure 13. Number of Clusters as a Function of the Number of
Colluding Countries.
This is confirmed with the plots of Figure 14 which shows
the number of colluding countries needed to separate the net-
work in differing numbers of connected components. With both
data sets, the trend is that, over time, more countries are required
to collude in order to separate the Internet into some predeter-
mined number of non-communicative clusters for approximately
25 clusters or more. For smaller isolated clusters, the number of
required countries remains relatively constant.
5.4 Overall Analysis
The Internet as a whole is becoming more resilient to colluding
country induced connectivity disruptions. This can be seen as
the lower bound on both the mean and maximal connectivity
between countries increased from 2008 to 2013 (as did the per-
centage of ‘invulnerable pairs’). Also, the number of countries
needed to either isolate a significant fraction of countries or dis-
connect a significant number of clusters has generally increased
substantially throughout the same time period.
However, these observed increases in resilience were only
Figure 14. Number of Colluding Countries Needed to Divide
the Network into x Clusters as a Function of the Year. “A, 10”
in the Legend, means that the plot is done using the entire data
set and the number of clusters is 10; “P” indicates that only the
persistent monitor data is used.
observed when isolating 25%or more of the countries and 25 or
more clusters from the core of the Internet. Some of the metrics
saw almost no change. The minimum pairwise connectivity
metric stayed at 1 for all years in the test set. This means that
the lower bound on the number of countries required to isolate
two countries never rose above 1. Also, for isolating 10% of the
countries from the Internet, the lower bound on the number of
necessary colluding countries stayed constant for each year with
a slight uptick in 2013. Likewise in the non-communicative
cluster analysis, the lower bound on separating 10 clusters from
the Internet required the same number of colluding countries
every year (with a small dip in 2009 and 2010).
A point of commonality among these three findings is that
they involve the smallest grouping of target countries in our
experiment, where those countries were the least connected
ones in the country-based AS graph. This suggests that, for
these most vulnerable countries (that are most easily cut off
from the Internet using the fewest colluding countries), their
robustness has not noticeably increased over the time period
of experimentation. This appears to be due to the fact that the
majority of new edges observed in the country AS graph had
at least one endpoint on a country that was already highly con-
nected. This “rich get richer” phenomenon has been observed in
other communications networks [5], and suggests that countries
that cannot offer significant connectivity to potential partners
will have difficulty obtaining sufficient communicating partners
to ensure the robustness of their connectivity to the rest of the
Internet.
Figure 15 shows the average degree of the isolated nodes per
year when some specific percentage of the countries in the Inter-
69
P. Mell / International Journal of Computer Science: Theory and Application
net are being isolated. Note that, when just 10% of the countries
are isolated, the average degree of the isolated countries is less
than 2. As the size of the set of isolated countries increases, the
average degree of the isolated nodes also increases. In addition,
while the degree of the isolated nodes for 10% isolation appears
relatively constant with respect to year, the degree increases
sharply for later years when examining the isolation of 65%
of the nodes in the graph, supporting the hypotheses that the
majority of new links are being formed to the most densely and
robustly connected nodes.
Figure 15. Average Degree of Isolated Nodes per Year. “A,
10%” in the Legend, means that the plot is done using the
entire data set, and the fraction of isolated nodes is 10%; “P”
indicates that only the persistent monitor data is used.
Since this is an analysis of observed bounds, our results pro-
vide strong indications (given our consistent and static method
of data collection and analysis). However, to further strengthen
our argument, we can greatly bias the results so that the latter
years should show a much greater resilience when attempting
to isolate a small percentage of countries. We can do this by
evaluating the ‘persistent monitor’ data from 2008 compared
to the ‘all data’ data set from 2013. When we do this, we bias
the year 2013 with 271 % more unique monitors than in the
year 2008. This larger set of monitors covers 90 % more coun-
tries, including countries in under-represented portions of the
globe with respect to monitor distribution (e.g., Bangladesh,
The Gambia, Iceland, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, and
Senegal). Given that these monitors are actively probing (as
opposed to passively monitoring), we should then discover many
more routes leading to results of greater resilience. However,
our overall conclusions remain the same as can be seen from
inspection of Figure 12 and Figure 14. It requires an increas-
ingly large group of colluding countries to cut off large sets of
nodes while the cost to cut off a small set remains relatively
static. Countries with poor connectivity remain susceptible to
connectivity attacks from groups of colluding countries even
when intentionally biasing the data to promote the chance of
obtaining the opposite result.
6. Related Work
We are unaware of any other study with the same focus as ours:
evaluation of the damage to Internet connectivity achievable
by groups of colluding countries. However, there are related
studies that cover individual countries cutting themselves off
from the Internet, accidental and deliberate failures of groups
of ASs, cascading failures, and the effect of routing policy on
Internet robustness.
The work of Dainotti et al. [29] and Cowie [30] focuses on
national actors disrupting their own country’s connectivity to the
Internet. In [29], historical incidents from 2011 in two countries
were evaluated for the factors that made it comparatively easy
for the countries to isolate themselves. This work was extended
by [30], where they examined the number of internationally-
facing ASs for each country as a measure of the robustness of
that country to a similar self-isolation attack (i.e., how many
domestic ASs would a government need to ‘notify’ in order to
cut off country connectivity). They conclude that 133 countries
could easily isolate themselves in such a fashion (having fewer
than 10 internationally facing ASs).
The work of Cohen et al. [31] provides a theoretical analysis
of the robustness of the Internet to random failures, focusing on
the giant component of power law graphs. They report that the
Internet is extremely robust to random node removal, being able
to retain a giant component even with random deletion of up
to 99 % of the nodes. While not their primary focus, the work
of Subramanian et al. [32] finds that the highly skewed degree
distribution for individual nodes within ASs can result in the
loss of a large number of links for removal of a single node. This
supports the findings of Wachs et al. [33] where they investigate
the ability to maliciously partition the Internet through causing
intentional AS failures. This work is most similar to ours, but
focuses on the intentional failure of sets of ASs irrespective of
their physical location or relationship to nation states. They
also only examine the conventional graph partition problem, in
which the focus is on generating a small number of partitions
of roughly equal size or weight. They conclude that anywhere
from 200 to 1500 nodes are required to find such a partition,
depending on the desired properties.
While our work focused on complete disruptions to con-
nectivity, the work of Guo et al. [13] evaluates how partial
disruptions can shift traffic flow, causing cascading failures.
They suggest that the existence of highly-connected nodes may
exacerbate the problem of link overload.
Lastly, several studies evaluate the effect of routing policy
(specifically the ‘valley-free’ restriction shown in Guo et al. [6]
on paths of directed links created by customer-provider relation-
ships) on the Internet’s resilience to failures. In Wu et al. [8],
a simulation-based model shows that policy-based routing can
significantly exacerbate the impact of regional failures, in many
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cases leading to complete loss of logical connectivity, despite the
presence of physical connectivity. Similarly, the work of Doley
et el. [9] demonstrates that under policy-based routing, removal
of 25 ASs from the graph is sufficient to reduce the size of the
largest connected component to under half the size of the origi-
nal AS graph they construct. However, these studies assume that
routing policy will not change during times of severe network
stress. In Hu et al. [7], they show that a relaxation of routing
policy during emergencies will significantly increase Internet
resilience (this is the approach taken by our work where we
model all physical links as bidirectional). They examine several
different failure models (depeering, link teardown, and regional
failures) and they demonstrate that relaxation of policy-based
routing allows for recovery of up to 80 % of communicating
pairs in a network under Tier-1 depeering. They also show that
regional failures – even when only a subset of links for region-
ally affected ASs are removed – can have potentially massive
impacts on internet connectivity as a whole.
7. Future Work
This study on the security of country connectivity graphs is the
first of its kind and thus a large amount of related work remains
to be explored. Most if not all of the data needed is already
publicly available from the CAIDA data sets.
One could model all the PoPs on the Internet and their con-
nectivity and analyze how an attacker could take out sets of PoPs
to damage the Internet. A caveat is that some PoPs shown in the
CAIDA data may actually be layer 2 networks (not individual
servers) and thus may be more resistant to attack than other
PoPs. Given that there are tens of millions PoPs on the Internet,
one would need to use an efficient vertex partitioning algorithm
such as our linear time DEG implementation.
One could conduct a study similar to ours but instead of
mapping ASs to their country of registration, one could map
the PoPs underlying the ASs to the countries in which they
physically reside. This would enable one to model countries
nationalizing the Internet infrastructure within their physical
boundaries to see what harm could be done. A similar analysis
to ours could be done on the ability of such colluding coun-
tries, which have nationalized their PoPs, to cause connectivity
disruptions among target countries
One could rerun our experiments without our approach of
modeling all edges as bidirectional (this time including the
‘valley-free restrictions discussed previously). This would show
the amount of damage colluding countries could do prior to
any possible policy changes implemented by the ASs. It should
show an even greater ability to do immediate damage to Internet
connectivity than is shown in this work.
Lastly, one could look at specific geographic regions com-
prising poorer countries to evaluate ways to improve their In-
ternet resilience. This would involve contacting people within
each of the physically adjacent countries to have them install the
CAIDA Arc monitors (provided for free by CAIDA). With such
a setup, the inter-country routes can be better detected enabling
visualization of regional Internet topology. One could compare
this topology to Internet topological studies of developed coun-
tries to evaluate resilience and to suggest more robust models.
Ideally, these enhanced topological models for the developing
nation regions would build on the existing topology by suggest-
ing new routes and measuring the related benefit as opposed to
reconstructing the existing topology.
8. Conclusion
The apparent robustness of Internet networking hides underlying
weakness. In this work, we have revealed a class of such weak-
nesses in the form of colluding countries deliberately filtering
out other countries. We analyzed a group of countries discon-
necting two other countries, isolating a set of countries from
the Internet, and breaking the Internet into non-communicative
clusters. We find that despite the potential for these attacks,
the Internet as a whole has become increasingly resilient over
the period of examination from 2008 to 2013. However, the
gains in robustness and resilience were primarily concentrated
in well-connected countries, which form an extremely resilient
core. We found that the less connected countries formed new
links largely with well-connected countries, and not to each
other, maintaining the centrality of the well-connected countries
in the paths between the less connected countries on the fringe.
Because of this, the resilience of these less connected countries
did not increase significantly over the time period studied. The
result is that a small set of countries is able to isolate significant
portions of the Internet or to divide it up into clusters. Individual
well connected countries are often able to unilaterally isolate
network dependent neighbors.
These weaknesses could be addressed through a focus on
establishing links between poorly connected countries (e.g.,
through grants to poorer countries or through collaboration be-
tween coalitions of physically adjacent countries). This would
move the poorly connected countries away from dependence
on the infrastructure of the more highly connected countries. It
would also move the Internet as a whole towards a more resilient
architecture through the provision of alternate geographically
diverse pathways.
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